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CHAPTER 2 
Security and Mortgages 
GEORGE P. DAVIS 
§2.1. Mortgage foredosure sale: Distribution of surplus funds. 
In Pioneer Credit Corporation v. Bloomberg,l the United States, as 
assignee of a first mortgage on certain real estate, sought foreclosure in 
the federal district court, naming as defendants the mortgagor, the 
appellant, who was the holder of a junior mortgage, and certain others. 
The court authorized the Government to sell the property in ac-
cordance with the terms of the power of sale contained in its first 
mortgage. The sale realized a net surplus over and above the Govern-
ment's secured indebtedness and expenses, and both the appellee, as 
assignee of the mortgagor, and the appellant, second mortgagee, made 
claim to the surplus. The district court found that nothing was pres-
endy due on the second mortgagee's note and ordered the surplus paid 
to the assignee of the mortgagor. 
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The court, 
applying Massachusetts law, held that the second mortgagee was 
entitled to immediate payment from the foreclosure surplus, even 
though the second mortgage note was not then in default. While it 
is elementary that the foreclosure of a senior mortgage discharges 
junior liens whose holders are made parties to the proceeding, the 
interests of the junior lienor in the property are not wiped out as 
far as the mortgagor or parties claiming through him are concerned.2 
The junior lienor has an interest in the proceeds of the sale and is 
entitled to any surplus, to the extent of that interest, before the mort-
gagor.s 
The lower court felt that because there was, at the moment, nothing 
due on the second mortgage note, the appellant had no present interest 
in the proceeds of the sale. The Court of Appeals rejected this con ten-
tention. The second mortgage, like the first, was a Massachusetts 
GEORGE P. DAVIS is a member of the firm of Nutter, McClennen &: Fish, Boston. 
He is author of the MaSJachusetts Conveyancers' Handbook (1956) and is chairman 
of the Land Use Committee of the Boston Bar Association. 
§2.1. 1 323 F.2d 992 (1st Cir. 1963). 
2 Ayer v. Philadelphia and Boston Face Brick. Co., 159 Mass. 84, 34 N.E. 177 
(1893); Otter v. Vaux, 6 DeG. M. &: G: 638, 43 Eng. Rep. 1381 (Ch. 1856). 
s Markey v. Langley, 92 U.S. 142, 23 L. Ed. 701 (1875); Pilok v. Bednarski, 230 
Mass. 56, 119 N.E. 360 (1918); Andrews v. Fiske, 101 Mass. 422 (1869); Manchester 
Federal Savings &: Loan Assn. v. Emery·Waterhouse Co., 102 N.H. 233, 153 A.2d 
918 (1959); Smart v. Burgess, 35 R.I. 149, 85 Atl. 742 (1913). 
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statutory short-form mortgage;4 therefore there was a breach of the 
second mortgage by reason of the fact that the mortgagor had defaulted 
on the earlier mortgage and permitted its foreclosure.1i Breach of its 
second mortgage gave the appellant a power of sale,6 upon the exercise 
of which it would have been entitled to "all sums then secured by the 
mortgage, whether then or thereafter payable."T 
The appellate court held it was irrelevant that the present sale was 
initiated by a senior mortgagee. The second mortgagee was a party 
to the proceedings, and the sale must be treated as made for the benefit 
of all parties as their interests should appears so that the second mort-
gagee could receive immediate payment for all sums then secured by 
its second mortgage, whether then or thereafter payable. 
§2.2. Mortgages: Subrogation. In French Lumber Co. v. Com-
mercial Realty &- Finance CO.,l the plaintiff, through a bill in equity, 
sought to determine the ownership of certain funds derived from the 
sale of an automobile at public auction. On February 9, 1959, French 
Lumber Co. purchased a 1959 Cadillac automobile and financed the 
purchase through Ware Trust Company, entering into a Uniform 
Commercial Code security agreement which was recorded. The lum-
ber company received $4600 which, together with a finance charge of 
$460, resulted in a total indebtedness to the trust company of $5060, 
to be repaid in twenty-three successive monthly installments of $207 
each. 
On July 10, 1959, the lumber company pledged its existing equity in 
the Cadillac to the defendant, Commercial Realty & Finance Co., as 
collateral security for funds advanced by it, and this second mortgage 
security interest was duly recorded. The second mortgage note to the 
finance company was for $8040, payable in sixty monthly installments 
of $134 each, and was secured further by a real estate mortgage, a 
chattel mortgage, and assignments of life insurance; the note was 
also endorsed by Arthur T. Winters and Charles W. Proctor. 
The lumber company failed to make payments under its first mort-
gage note to the trust company, which ordered repossession of the 
Cadillac. Winters and Proctor thereupon conferred with Associates 
Discount Corporation (henceforth called Associates) about refinancing 
the Cadillac, which was then in the trust company's possession. As a 
result of these negotiations, Winters and Proctor entered into a security 
agreement with Associates, which was duly recorded, covering the 
refinancing of the Cadillac for the total sum of $5022. 
Upon receiving a note for this amount, signed by Winters and 
Proctor, Associates issued a check for $4256, payable to the trust com-
pany, Winters, and Proctor. This check was turned over to the trust 
4 G.L .• c. 8l1. §§8. 18·21. 
!lId. §20. 
6Id. §21. 
TId. §27. 
S See Hunnewell v. Goodrich. !I Cum. 469 (Mass. 1849). 
§2.2. 1 lI46 Mass. 716. 195 N.E.2d 507 (1964). 
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company, and a notation that it was paid in full was made on the trust 
company's first mortgage note. Subsequently, the trust company sent 
the security agreement and discharge to Associates. 
On the check given by Associates there was a notation, over the 
endorsements of Winters, Proctor, and the trust company, that it was 
payment in full for the Cadillac. 
Later, Associates repossessed the Cadillac because of default in the 
payments, and a public auction followed. This case involved the 
question of ownership of the $3200 proceeds of the foreclosure sale. 
The finance company claimed the proceeds on the theory that its 
second mortgage became a first mortgage when the amount owed to 
the trust company was paid. Associates claimed the proceeds on the 
theory that it became subrogated to the rights of the trust company 
when it paid the first mortgage note. 
The trial court made a finding to the effect that there was no evi-
dence to indicate that the lumber company, Winters, or Proctor had 
even informed Associates that the finance company held any security 
interest in the Cadillac, and it was found that Associates had no knowl-
edge of this second mortgage. It would be incredible to think that 
Associates as third mortgagee would not have taken appropriate steps, 
by way of an assignment from the trust company, to protect its interest, 
if it had been aware of the situation. 
The trial court stated that Associates' negligence in failing to check 
recording records would not necessarily bar it from obtaining the relief 
it sought through subrogation. The negligence was in regard to its 
own interests and did not prejudicially affect the interests of the 
finance company as second mortgagee. There had been no change of 
position by the second mortgagee. If Associates had taken an assign-
ment from the trust company, the finance company, as second mort-
gagee, would have had no cause for complaint. 
The trial court entered a decree declaring that Associates was en-
titled to the entire proceeds from the sale. The finance company, 
as second mortgagee, appealed this decision. The Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. 
The pertinent portion of the Uniform Commercial Code2 provides 
that the order of filing determines the order of priorities among con-
flicting interests in the same collateral. Under this provision the 
order of priorities would be the trust company as first mortgagee, the 
finance company as second mortgagee, and Associates as third mort-
gagee. This would establish the finance company's priority over 
Associates, unless Associates could establish a right to succeed to the 
trust company's priority. 
A security interest may be "assigned" to another creditor without 
loss of its priority, even if no filing is made under the Code.s Thus, 
the trust company could have made an assignment of its security in-
2 G.L., c. 106, §9-812(5)(a). 
SId. §9-802(2). 
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terest to Associates, who would then have acquired the trust company's 
priority over the finance company. But no such assignment was made. 
Associates could also have acquired the trust company's priority 
through the doctrine of subrogation.' The plaintiff, having paid the 
debts of another out of its funds and taken its mortgage in the mistaken 
belief that it would have a first lien, was not officious. In such circum-
stances equity has given relief by way of subrogation when the interest 
of intervening lienors was not prejudicially affected. The trial judge, 
having found that the conduct of Associates did not prejudice the 
finance company or cause it to change its position, was of the opinion 
that this principle was applicable, and he found that Associates had 
priority over the finance company. 
The finance company argued that Associates, through foreclosing its 
third mortgage, had elected to stand on its own subsequent security 
interest and should have no rights to the trust company's interest. 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected this argument, holding that As-
sociates was seeking to collect its own claim, and that this was not 
inconsistent with its present claim for subrogation to the trust com-
pany's rights. The Court held that the general principles of subroga-
tion are not superseded by the Uniform Commercial Code. 
The finance company argued that even if Associates was entitled to 
subrogation, its rights could rise no higher than the trust company's 
rights.1> The trust company had received $4256 from Associates in 
payment of the balance due on the lumber company's debt to the trust 
company. Associates, before it commenced foreclosure proceedings, 
had received $1297.50 in payments by the lumber company on its debt 
to Associates. The finance company argued that this $1297.50 should 
be allocated as payment on the $4256 balance owed to the trust com-
pany at the time Associates paid off the lumber company's debt to the 
trust company. This could limit Associates' subrogation rights to 
$2958.50. 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected this argument, stating that 
Associates had a right to enforce and collect its own claim without 
displacing its subrogation rights. The Court held that Associates 
was entitled to subrogation rights in the full amount of the proceeds. 
§2.3. Mortgage foreclosure: Statute of frauds: Agreement to bid 
at sale. In First National Bank of Boston v. Fairhaven Amusement 
Company,1 the evidence showed that on July 22. 1958, the defendants 
made an oral agreement with the plaintiff to bid at least $135,000 at a 
judicial foreclosure sale for personal property on which the plaintiff 
held a chattel mortgage and for the interest in a ten-year lease of real 
'Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Baker, 299 Mass. 158, 12 N.E.2d 199 (19117); 
Hill v. Wiley, 295 Mass. 11OO, II N.E.2d 1015 (19116); Worcester North Savings Institu-
tion v. Farwell. 292 Mass. 568, 198 N.E. 897 (19115). 
I> Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Baker. 299 Mass. 158. 162. 12 N.E.2d 199, 
201 (19117). 
§2.ll. 1 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 515, 197 N.E.2d 607. also noted in §6.4 infra. 
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estate which had been assigned to the plaintiff as part of the collateral 
for the loan. The sale was held on February 6, 1959, in Connecticut, 
pursuant to court order, but the defendants failed to bid. 
The property, consisting of personal property and the leasehold 
interest, was sold to one Polland, the highest bidder, for $85,000. On 
February 16, 1959, the sale was confirmed by the lower court. The 
plaintiff brought this action of contract to recover the sum of $50,000, 
the difference between the amount realized at the sale and the amount 
the defendants had agreed to bid for the plaintiff. The defendants 
pleaded the statute of frauds.2 At the conclusion of the evidence, the 
judge directed verdicts for defendants on the ground that the agree-
ment concerned an interest in land and, not being in writing, was 
within the statute of frauds. This decision was affirmed on appeal. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the contract being made in 
Massachusetts, its enforceability was to be determined by Massachusetts 
law.s 
The plaintiff argued that the agreement was to bid at a judicial 
sale; that such sales are not governed by the statute of frauds; and, 
therefore, the agreement to bid at the sale, although oral, was not 
within the statute. The plaintiff further argued that, unlike an 
ordinary auction, execution, or foreclosure sale, a judicial sale should 
not be within the statute because it is conducted under the supervision 
of a court of equity, which is well equipped to prevent the evils that 
the statute was designed to prevent. This was a case of first impres-
sion in Massachusetts, but in other jurisdictions it has been held that 
judicial sales do not come within the statute.4 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected this argument, stating that the 
oral agreement sought to be enforced in this case was a preliminary 
agreement not arrived at under the supervision of a court and, conse-
quently, not clothed with such protection from fraud as would attend 
a judicial sale. An oral bid at a foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to 
a power of sale in a mortgage, if no memorandum has been made by 
the auctioneer, is within the statute of frauds and unenforceable.5 
The Court held that an agreement to bid is governed by the same 
principle, and that the preliminary agreement relative to bidding was 
thus subject to the statute. 
The plaintiff also argued that the agreement to bid $135,000 at the 
sale for the leasehold and personal property was not "a contract for 
the sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments or of any interest con-
cerning them."6 The Court rejected this argument, holding that the 
2 G.L., c. 259, §1; id., c. 106, §6. 
8 Thomas G. Jewett, Jr., Inc. v. Keystone Driller Co., 282 Mass. 469,475, 185 N.E. 
369, 371 (1933); Clark v. State Street Trust Co., 270 Mass. 140, 169 N.E. 897 (1930). 
4 In re Susquehanna Chemical Corp., 92 F. Supp. 917 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Campbell 
v. Carter, 248 Ala. 294, 27 So. 2d 490 (1946); Cook v. Safe Deposit &: Trust Co., 172 
Md. 398, 191 At!. 713 (1937); Andrews v. O'Mahoney, 112 N.Y. 567, 572, 20 N.E. 
374, 375 (1889). 
5 Weiner v. Slovin, 270 Mass. 392, 169 N.E. 64 (1930). 
6 G.L., c. 259, §l, Foul'th. 
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leasehold was an interest in land subject to the statute.'/' The bidding 
price was indivisible and made no allocation of value between the 
interest in land and the personal property, and thus the entire agree-
ment was brought within the statute.s 
§2.4. Equitable mortgages. In Rand v. Goldblattl the plaintiff 
brought a bill in equity to establish ownership of all the issued stock 
of Rand & Company, Inc. An order was sought that the defendant, 
in whose name the stock stood, endorse it and deliver it over to the 
plaintiff and submit his resignation as president, treasurer, and direc-
tor of the corporation. By a final decree it was so ordered, and the 
defendant appealed. 
In 1958 the partnership business of the plaintiff's husband was in 
financial difficulty. Goldblatt, the plaintiff's father, his son-in-law, and 
counsel coordinated their efforts in a plan to save the partnership 
business by (a) filing a petition for an arrangement under Chapter XI 
of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, (b) organizing Rand & Company, Inc., 
and (c) selling it the partnership assets. All of the stock in the cor-
poration was issued to Goldblatt and he became president, treasurer, 
and a director. 
Under the refinancing plan, the plaintiff and her husband turned 
over checks and cash totaling over $25,000 to the receiver. A bank 
loan of $50,000, secured in large measure by properties of the plaintiff 
and her husband, was arranged. The note to the bank was addi-
tionally secured by Goldblatt's pledge of all the stock of the new cor-
poration, by endorsement of the note by Goldblatt and his wife, and 
by securities owned by Goldblatt. 
The Court held that, in determining whether there was an equitable 
mortgage, the intent of the parties at the time of the transfer of the 
stock to Goldblatt was decisive.2 The judge found that Goldblatt 
had agreed to turn over the stock to the plaintiff when the bank loan 
was paid, that this event had occurred, and that "it was never intended 
that ... Goldblatt should have at any time a complete ownership of 
any kind whatsoever in said shares of stock." The trial court held 
that it was intended to transfer the stock to Goldblatt as an equitable 
mortgage, so that in equity Goldblatt would hold the stock subject to 
a right of redemption. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
trial judge's conclusion was amply supported and affirmed the final 
decree of the lower court. 
§2.5. Small loans. In Remy v. Sher,l the plaintiffs borrowed 
'/' O'Brien v. Hurley, !I!H Mass. 172, 176, 117 N.E.2d 922, 924 (1954), cert. denied, 
!l50 U.S. 940, 76 Sup. Ct. !ll!1 (1954); McMullen v. Riley, 6 Gray 500 (Mass. 1856); 
Inderlied v. Campbell, 119 Me. !IO!I, 111 Atl. !I!I!! (1920). 
SHurley v. Donovan, 182 Mass. 64, 68-69, 64 N.E. 685, 687-688 (1902); Irvine v. 
Stone, 6 Cush. 508, 512-51!1 (Mass. 1850). 
§2.4. 1 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 899, 199 N.E..2d 207. 
2 Frank v. Frank, !l4O Mass. 1!12, 1!15, 162 N.E..2d 781, 78!! (1959); Gerace v. 
Gerace, !l01 Mass. 14, 17-19, 16 N.E.2d 6, 8-9 (1938). 
§2.5. 1 M6 Mass. 471, 194 N.E..2d 106 (196!1). 
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money secured in part by a second mortgage on real estate and in part 
by a mortgage on an automobile. Certain payments were made on 
the real estate mortgage, but no payments were made on the note 
secured by the chattel mortgage on the automobile. The second mort-
gage was also in default, and the defendant commenced foreclosure 
proceedings in the Land Court. In this bill in equity for an account-
ing, the plaintiff contended that the note secured by the chattel mort-
gage on the automobile did not comply with General Laws, Chapter 
140, Section gOB, which requires that such a note specify "as separate 
items the principal sum, the rate of interest or its equivalent in money, 
the period of the loan and periodic due dates." 
The note specified "rate of interest or its equivalent in money 
$2356.80." This was in fact the total amount of interest due for the 
entire five-year period of the note. The note provided that 
payments of $114.28 should be made each month for sixty months and 
gave the total amount in dollars that was to be charged for interest. 
The plaintiffs conceded that they could establish that for the first 
month the sum of $67.50 was applied to interest and $46.78 to princi-
pal, and that similar computations can be made for each month. They 
contended, however, that it was never intended by the legislature that 
the rate· of interest or its equivalent should be kept secret and the bor-
rower obliged to make computations to find out what he owed, the 
interest he was being required to pay, and the amount of principal 
applied out of each payment. 
The Court rejected this argument, holding that the statutory require-
ment of a statement as to the "rate of interest or its equivalent in 
money" was met by the note involved by its stating the equivalent in 
money of the interest charged. It was not necessary to specify either 
the rate of interest or the monthly equivalent in money. 
§2.6. Attaching creditor: Rights to eminent domain damages. 
In Kahler v. Town of Marshfield,1 Blunt owned certain real estate in 
Marshfield that was subject to a mortgage. An attachment was made 
against Blunt's real estate, and the case remained pending for a con-
siderable period of time without being reduced to judgment. In the 
meantime, the town of Marshfield made a taking of the real estate. 
The award for damages was determined and the town first paid the 
amount due on the mortgage and then paid the balance to Blunt. 
Blunt dissipated the funds received from the town and subsequently 
was adjudicated a bankrupt. The plaintiffs, as attaching creditors, 
perfected judgment against Blunt. When the plaintiffs were unable 
to secure a recovery of their judgment either from Blunt directly or 
from the funds which Blunt had received from the town and subse-
quently dissipated, they brought this suit on the theory that the town 
should have paid them or reserved funds for them as attaching credi-
tors. The trial judge rejected this claim and the plaintiffs appealed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the plaintiffs, as attaching 
§2.6. 1 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 837, 198 N.E.2d 647. 
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creditors, were entitled to recover the amount of their judgments and 
interest from the town. The Court pointed out that it has long been 
established that attaching creditors are in the position of purchasers 
for value.2 
The Court quoted with approval from Chief Justice Shaw: 
By the law of Massachusetts, an attachment of property on 
mesne process is a specific charge upon the property, for the 
security for the debt sued for, and the property is set apart and 
placed in the custody of the law, for that purpose, subject only 
to the condition that the attaching creditor shall obtain judgment 
in the suit, take out execution and levy it upon the property so 
held, within a limited time.s 
The Court also quoted from Justice Gray:4 "An attachment of real 
estate, duly made and recorded, doubtless creates an immediate lien, 
which, if made effectual by a levy of execution in due form within 
thirty days after judgment, is not impaired by any intervening encum-
brance upon or alienation of the real estate attached."5 
The recording of the order of taking extinguished the plaintiffs' 
lien,~ but the town's acquisition of a title free of encumbrances did 
not completely terminate the plaintiffs' rights, but gave rise to an 
equitable lien in their favor. If the proceeds had been found in the 
hands of Blunt, the lien would have attached to them.7 The Court 
concluded that since the proceeds had been dissipated, the plaintiffs 
were entitled to recover from the town, which made payment in viola-
tion of the plaintiffs' property right of which it had constructive notice 
through the recording of the attachment in the registry of deeds.8 
The Court also noted that Professor Scott states: "Where the 
claimant would be entitled to enforce a constructive trust or equitable 
lien upon the product of his property if his property could be traced 
into a product, but he is unable to trace it, he may be entitled to 
2 Stoneham Five Cents Savings Bank v. Johnson, 295 Mass. 390, 394, 3 N.E.2d 
730, 731 (1936); Hampden Natl. Bank v. Hampden R.R., 246 Mass. 404, 407, 141 
N.E. 107, 108-109 (1923); Waltham Co-operative Bank v. Barry, 231 Mass. 270, 121 
N.E. 71 (1918); Whitney v. Metallic Window Screen Mfg. Co., 187 Mass. 557, 560, 
73 N.E. 663, 664 (1905); Cowley v. McLaughlin, 141 Mass. 181, 182, 4 N.E. 821. 
821-822 (1886); Woodward v. Sartwell, 129 Mass. 210. 212 (1880). 
S Davenport v. TiIton. 10 Metc. 320. 327 (Mass. 1845). 
4 Gardner v. Barnes. 106 Mass. 505. 506 (1871). 
I> G.L .• c. 223. §59; Hom v. Hitchcock. 332 Mass. 643. 644-645. 127 N.E.2d 482. 
484 (1955). 
~ G.L .• c. 79. §3. 
7 Cohen v. Wasserman, 238 F.2d 683. 686·688 (1st Cir. 1956); Gimbel v. Stolte. 59 
Ind. 446, 453 (1877). See Bullen v. De Bretteville. 239 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 1956). 
cert. denied sub. nom. Treasure Co. v. Bullen. 353 U.S. 947. 77 Sup. Ct. 825 (1957); 
Thibodo v. United States, 134 F. Supp. ~8 (S.D. Cal. 1955). 
8 Barnett v. O'Neal, 270 Ala. 58. 61. 116 So.2d 375. 377 (1959). See Wilson v. 
Beville, 47 Cal. 2d 852, 855·856. 306 P.2d 789, 791 (1957); Seaboard All-Florida Ry. 
v. Levitt, 105 Fla. 600, 141 So. 886 (1932); Sherwood v. Lafayette, 109 Ind. 411. 10 
N.E. 891 (1886); Municipal Securities Corp. v. Kansas City, 195 Mo. App. 464, 193 
S.W. 880 (1917). 
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maintain a proceeding in equity to enforce a personal liability of the 
wrongdoer."9 
The Court also noted that to uphold the town's contention that 
there is no provision for the protection of the plaintiffs' property right 
would raise serious doubts as to the constitutionality of the eminent 
domain statute. 
§2.7. Statutes. A great many statutes affecting mortgages and 
security were enacted by the 1964 Legislature. 
Chapter 731 makes it clear that first mortgages of record shall have 
priority over the lien upon condominium units for the unit owner's 
share of common expense. 
Chapter 227 permits a co-operative bank to make a loan in excess 
of $30,000 to one person, evidenced by a single note secured by a 
mortgage covering two or more parcels of real estate owned by said 
person, provided that loans by such bank in excess of $30,000 shall not 
exceed 75 percent of the value of the mortgaged property as certified 
by the security committee. 
Chapter 219 provides that a savings bank may make a mortgage loan 
of up to 90 percent of the value of the real estate, payable not more 
than twenty-five years from the date of the note, provided that the loan 
shall be secured by a mortgage on real estate improved with a single 
family dwelling occupied or to be occupied by the mortgagor. The 
terms of the note or mortgage shall require monthly payments in such 
amounts that the aggregate principal reduction at any time during the 
term of the loan shall be not less than that which would be required 
in the case of a note of like amount and interest rate providing for 
complete amortization by equal monthly payments over a period of 
twenty-five years. It is provided further that the construction of the 
dwelling on the mortgaged property shall be completed prior to the 
making of any disbursements on the loan in excess of 80 percent of 
the value of the real estate, that the mortgagor shall furnish to the 
board of investment an affidavit that the mortgagor does not require 
junior financing, and that the board of investment shall certify in 
writing that the dwelling has a useful life beyond the term the loan 
has to run. Each such monthly payment shall be applied first to 
interest and then the balance to principal. Interest upon such loan 
shall be computed monthly on the unpaid balance. The note or 
mortgage also shall require payment each month of a proportionate 
part of the estimated real estate taxes and betterment assessments on 
the mortgaged real estate. No loan of this class shall exceed $20,000. 
Chapter 206 provides for savings bank loans secured by mortgages 
on leasehold interests in air rights over land owned or held by the 
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority. 
Chapter 95 further regulates the making of real estate mortgage 
loans by domestic 'insurance companies. 
94 Scott, Trusts §522 (2d ed. 1956). 
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